ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Both to address unmet medical needs and to improve industry competitiveness, governments in the European Union (EU) and the United States have taken bold steps to promote the movement of medical research and 
2014]
Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partnerships 375 tive Medicines Initiative] research agenda," 9 Europe will need to pursue similar initiatives. Experts predict that NCATS could help address the "valley of death"-"the large research and funding gap that sets federally funded basic researchers (those . . . in nonprofit research institutions, academia, hospitals, and federal laboratories) on one side and the pharmaceutical industry on the other."
10 As John C. Reed, Donald Bren Chief Executive Chair at the Sanford-Burnham Medical Research Institute in La Jolla, California, explained:
[P]rivate companies and venture capitalists are increasingly reluctant to fund the crucial early stages of preclinical developmentthe research necessary to "translate" promising discoveries made in laboratories into optimized candidate therapeutics ready for testing in clinical trials.
This gap includes many steps in the drug discovery and development process, including assay development, high-throughput screening, medicinal chemistry, exploratory pharmacology, and rigorous preclinical testing of drug efficacy and safety in animal models of disease. ( proposing a two-tier regime for promoting "intensive, largescale collaboration between academics, who possess unique skills in designing assays that can identify promising targets, and pharmaceutical firms that hold libraries of potentially useful small molecules as trade secrets, making them largely off limits to these same academic scientists."). 11 Reed, supra note 10. One of the NIH programs transferred to NCATS is the Molecular Libraries Probe Production Centers Network (MLPCN), "the first federally funded network to facilitate drug discovery by producing early-stage small molecule leads." Id. As Dr. Reed explained: "These centers, most of which reside in universities and nonprofit research institutes across the U.S., provide federally funded researchers and even small biotechnology companies with access to drug discovery capabilities previously found only within large pharmaceutical companies. Those capabilities include large chemical libraries, assay development, ultra high-throughput robotic screening, cheminformatics, medicinal chemistry, project management, and several other drug discovery-related services that typically don't exist in academic labs and departments." Id. The NIH's Molecular Libraries Small Molecule Repository contains more than 100,000 small molecules generated by the academic researchers. General Information, MOLECULAR LIBRARIES INITIATIVE, https://mli.nih.gov/mli/compoundrepository/mlsmr-compounds/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). These molecules are released into the public domain and are available for researchers doing "high-throughput screening (HTS) of small molecule libraries against assays containing target proteins to identify promising compounds that may lead to patentable drugs." Rai et al., supra note 10, at 7. Unlike biologics, which are comprised of macromolecules that are expensive to produce, small molecule drugs can be mass-produced at a lower cost. Id. at 3. [Vol. 4 This article focuses on pharmaceutical public-private partnerships (PPPPs) 12 involving a public university or research institute (or a private university or institute conducting medical research funded by the government) and a private firm in the pharmaceutical industry to develop new drugs that can be sold by the pharmaceutical firm at a profit. 13 For example, Bristol-Myers Squibb formed a public-private partnership with ten cancer research institutes-the International Immuno-Oncology Network-to "facilitate the translation of scientific research findings into clinical trials and, eventually, clinical practice, as well as advance innovation in drug discovery and development." 14 The purpose of this article is to promote the use of PPPPs by providing an annotated roadmap for universities and private pharmaceutical firms.
In contrast to the for-profit PPPPs discussed in this article, there are a variety of subsidized international public-private partnerships involving the World Health Organization (WHO), including the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Stop TB Partnership, and the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, that are designed to provide affordable medicines for so-called "diseases of poverty" in developing countries. 15 For example, Pfizer, Merck Serona, and Chemtura have joined the WHO's Tropical Disease Network and allow its Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases Compound Evaluation Network "to submit targets for in-house screening against a subset of the firms' respective chemical libraries." 16 Partnerships of this sort, which are "highly integrated relationships among states, international organizations, companies, NGOs, research institutes, and/or philanthropic foundations,"
17 are designed to address the market's failure to incentivize private 12 As Julia Paschal Davis notes, notwithstanding the word "partnership," public-private partnerships "are defined and bound by contracts; they are no more or less than the documents negotiated, approved, and executed." Public-Private Partnerships, 44 FALL PROCUREMENT LAW. 9, 9 (2008).
13 Unlike Gian Luca Burci, who defines a pharmaceutical public-private partnership as a "long-term collaborative arrangement among a group of diverse stakeholders, some of which [are] of a public nature (e.g. government agencies and intergovernmental organizations) and others of a private nature (e.g. non-governmental organizations, private commercial companies, research institutes, professional associations etc.) to jointly pursue a discreet public health goal," Gian Luca Burci, 
Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partnerships 377 firms to develop and market drugs that would not be profitable without government or NGO funding. 18 Although certain aspects of our analysis are applicable to NGO-and development country-related projects, there are significant differences between such arrangements and a for-profit strategic alliance between a single for-profit medical enterprise and one or more universities. Thus, except as otherwise noted, we use the term "PPPPs" to refer to the latter type of for-profit arrangements.
In Part I, we describe the pharmaceutical market. In Part II, we explain how a partnership arrangement between a public university 19 and a private firm can promote drug innovation and discuss key aspects of such an arrangement. In Part III, we use game theory to explain why efficient PPPPs need to be supported by a binding contract, the free exchange of information, and positive aligned incentives. Part IV provides lessons from publicprivate partnerships in the construction industry and applies them to PPPPs. In Part V, we suggest various add-ons to existing contracts and game-changing contract clauses for strategic alliances designed to encourage joint optimization and the efficient allocation of added value from joint medical research discoveries and commercialization. These provisions can promote not only more efficient PPPPs but also more efficient joint government-industry projects such as the Accelerating Medicines Partnership in the United States and the Innovative Medicines Initiative in the EU.
I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET
In 2011, worldwide expenditures on pharmaceuticals approached $1 trillion. 20 That year, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom alone spent $159 billion on medicine. 21 The United States spent $322 billion. 22 The pharmaceutical industry is a major industry in both the EU and the United States, 23 and it is highly concentrated. 24 As seen in The health care sector accounted for approximately 9% of EU GDP in 2010 26 and nearly double that in the United States. 27 Because total healthcare expenditures are rising faster than economic growth in both the EU and the U.S., the ratio of health care spending to GDP is increasing. A substantial portion of the growth in health care expenses is attributable to pharmaceuticals. 28 figures, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/competitiveness/importance/facts-figures_en.htm. (According to the World Trade Organization, "the global pharmaceuticals market is worth US$300 billion a year, a figure expected to rise to US$400 billion within three years. The 10 largest drugs companies control over one-third of this market, several with sales of more than US$10 billion a year and profit margins of about 30%. Six are based in the United States and four in Europe. It is predicted that North and South America, Europe and Japan will continue to account for a full 85% of the global pharmaceuticals market well into the 21st century," http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/. 
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The development of new pharmaceuticals is both high risk 29 and high cost, with new drugs costing a billion dollars or more to bring to market. 30 The productivity challenge in the pharmaceutical industry can be explained in part by an increase in R&D costs, 31 reduced output, and depleted pipelines. 32 Innovation losses in developing new drugs are increasing across the industry. 33 Although the number of new, approved molecular entities has remained steady in the past ten years, the cost of new drug development has increased significantly in both the U.S. and the EU. 34 The pharmaceutical industry in both the U.S. and the EU are looking for new ways to sustain pharmaceutical innovation and sell new products. At the same time, pharmaceutical enterprises suffer from inefficient internal processes to perform basic science and to assess the value of "proof of concept" inventions, especially when they involve distant knowledge domains. 35 In addition, the shareholders of the major pharmaceutical firms have grown accustomed to dramatic returns from "blockbusters,"
36 which are costly to develop. Despite its wishes to the contrary, the industry anticipates change because "[t]he era of the blockbuster is ending."
37
The national market for medicines is highly regulated. Competition and corporate behavior are shaped by national health systems, national regulatory requirements for price and product information, legal rules governing 29 In the United States, the FDA regulates the testing, approval, and marketing of pharmaceuticals as well as medical devices. 41 Other developed countries have similar regulators. 42 Competitiveness in the pharmaceutical industry is thus negatively affected by market fragmentation and different national regulatory regimes.
Patents make it possible for the pharmaceutical industry to prevent the production and sale of cheap generics and to extract rents. 43 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) requires World Trade Organization members to grant and honor patents on pharmaceuticals. 44 Although the Doha Agreement 45 permits countries 38 There has been limited harmonization since 1990 involving the U.S., the EU, and Japan pursuant to the results from the International Conference "to issue compulsory licenses to meet the health needs of nations unable to produce locally needed medicines," 46 developing countries continue to face difficulties in obtaining essential medicines at affordable prices. 47 As a result of this competitive and regulatory environment, the pharmaceutical industry has tried multiple strategies to increase new product development and the return on investment. Examples include increasing R&D efforts, horizontal consolidation, biotech in-licensing and acquisitions, 48 and outsourcing to "drug discovery" firms. 49 In this article, we focus on forprofit PPPP arrangements between government-funded academic institutions and private pharmaceutical firms designed to spur pharmacogenomics and other drug innovations.
II. KEY ASPECTS OF THE PPPP ARRANGEMENT

A. The Need for Collaboration
The pharmaceutical industry is a science industry for which innovation is the fundamental source of competitiveness. 50 If pharmaceutical enterprises try to operate all aspects of their businesses in-house, demands on investment and the corresponding risk increase. If, instead, based upon the idea behind fixed cost and strategic alliances, 51 pharmaceutical enterprises partner with external inventors and funding sources (including the government), the risk and need for investment decrease and the cost can be shared with the partner. 52 When members of the pharmaceutical industry look for new ways to institutionalize and sustain pharmaceutical innovation and to sell new products, they now also look for university partners. 54 after receiving more than 300 applications from researchers. 55 The objective of this initiative is to conduct joint research aimed at finding new "biotherapeutic modalities . . . across all therapeutic areas" to "transform research and development through a focus on translational medicine." 56 The CTI manage the PPPPs on a project-by-project basis. The incentives, operating models, and goals for both the academic and Pfizer researchers are designed to achieve a positive Proof-of-Mechanism study in humans. 57 Although several studies have shown that public sector research can and already does play an important role in the discovery of new drugs, the interaction and collaboration between the public and private sectors remains both limited and complex. 58 Traditionally, the pharmaceutical entities have co-financed research projects by academic researchers and, in the end, assumed ownership of all the resulting intellectual property. In some cases, the private firms have paid royalties to the academic institutions or individual researchers on successful products.
A study of sixty-two American universities concluded that most university inventions "are so embryonic that further development with the active involvement by the inventor is required for any chance of commercialization." 59 As a result, "[i]n the pharmaceutical industry, firm connectedness to the academic community, such as through collaboration and coauthoring 
B. Objectives of the PPPP Relationship
The objectives of the PPPP arrangement are to complete some or all of the steps, from basic science to drug commercialization, in a manner that is optimal for all parties, from a game theory perspective, to create maximum joint utility. This requires the creation of a fully collaborative team with a high level of cooperation, trust, information sharing (including open access to the books and records for all participants), and positive joint incentives.
62
The PPPP contract should incorporate all of these attributes regardless of whether the cooperation deals with the identification and validation of new targets, access to new technologies, pharmacogenomics, pre-clinical pharmacology, structural analysis of biomolecules, diagnostic tools and microarray development, bioinformatics, or identification and validation of biomarkers.
To deliver an efficient framework for collaboration, the PPPP contract must include mechanisms for encouraging cooperative behavior, leading to a win-win approach rather than a traditional competitive approach. 63 Thus, the PPPP contract should encourage the parties to collaborate with a strong fo- cus on attaining common goals by sharing gains or losses and information, and by instituting risk and reward systems to build and share innovation. It should also promote continuous long-term improvement. This should be reflected in the contract terms. For example, the contract should include explicit clauses obliging the parties to use reasonable efforts to achieve joint utility and rewarding the attainment of joint goals.
Therefore, we argue, a PPPP agreement should both be reduced to writing and be coupled with respect for relational norms, thereby ensuring the most efficient transaction. If the PPPP contract and the relational forms of governance address the key factors optimally, they can change the payoffs in the game and thereby enhance the joint values. In particular, as discussed in Part III, the PPPP arrangement will move the parties away from an inefficient prisoners' dilemma Nash equilibrium to a Pareto Optimal Frontier. This is in contrast to a traditional arm's-length contract, which often consists of each party's optimizing its own rewards and minimizing its own risks while allocating the cost of future breaches.
If the contract objectives are joint utility, efficiency, innovation, and commercial optimization, the fulfillment obligations must balance the needs and interests of all the parties. This includes the academic researchers, the research universities, industry participants and their shareholders, and the government or other public provider of research funding. Academics seek to create and disseminate knowledge, which requires optimization of publishing data and results in international journals. Although some academic researchers may be willing to defer publication until a patent application is filed, significant publication delays are problematic. 64 The industry players can use the resources in the public sector to fill the innovation gap and change the model of drug development, thereby developing and commercializing innovative drugs and earning an attractive return on investment in R&D for their shareholders.
65 From a societal perspective, joint utility is increased when consumers gain access to a new drug more rapidly and cheaply than would be the case if there were no public-private collaboration.
Contract negotiation, collaboration management, funding, timelines, the production of deliverables, confidentiality, the sharing of intellectual property, and understanding the differences among the parties are all crucial contractual elements that must be considered to make the PPPP work effectively. Behind the PPPP arrangement, there will usually be an industryspecific, agreed-upon document. A committee-type collaborative body, 64 See Rai et al, supra note 10, at 25. 
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Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partnerships 385 which includes representatives from all of the parties, is usually necessary to establish the terms of the contract. If there is a cooperative body involved, it is crucial that the parties hand over the contract negotiation to the cooperative body and that such body follows the PPPP framework contract during the contract period.
66
Even when there is no cooperative body, it is important for all the negotiators to keep in mind the importance of ensuring the free flow of information and the alignment of incentives. Drafters and negotiators should focus especially on common goals and joint utility, rather than on traditional views of control and claims of exclusive property rights. This knowledge should be derived from, for example, game theory. The understanding of joint utility and the maximization of the output, or "the size of the pie," is shown by Table 2 below. The contract clauses must prevent the inefficient prisoners' dilemma Nash equilibrium and aim for the maximum output by focusing on the transaction.
To achieve this perspective, it is critical to conduct specialized training for both the public and private researchers, administrative and managerial staff, which may include training in translational or pharmaceutical medicine covering target and drug discovery, preclinical development, clinical trials, and management. 67 This helps ensure the proper functioning of an alternative project organization with a project-oriented collaborative culture that enables physical mobility among the academic and industry staff and researchers. 68 The parties should thus consider appointing a joint project manager group, comprising representatives from all of the PPPP's institutions, with weekly meetings and a strong back line to the analytical staff. 69 They might also form a project committee, a committee of coordinators, or an alliance committee with representation from all parties, then give that body the responsibility for managing the project. For example, such a committee should discuss and decide the substantive criteria for common goals, incentives, and responsibilities. 67 Demotes-Mainard, Canet & Segard, supra note 65, at 332. Demotes-Mainard, Canet & Segard describe two public-private partnership (PPP) models: the simultaneous PPP and the sequential PPP and several other PPP situations, in which the partnership consists of services or expertise and in which the public sector acts as an infrastructure providing equipment, competences or research material for the industry as well as situations in which a small or medium enterprise (SME) may act as a subcontractor for an academic laboratory. 68 71 explains why the parties to a PPPP cannot maximize joint positive utility unless they both (1) enter into a legally binding contract that explicitly supports the alliance elements instead of just a gentleman's agreement and (2) respect relational norms. To be effective, the PPPP must ensure that the parties act as agreed and have access to symmetrical information, that is, that they both cooperate and coordinate their actions. 72 In short, the goal is to ensure that the parties do not return to their former traditional ways of doing business. 73 A properly framed binding contract, coupled with respect for positive social norms, can move the parties away from an inefficient prisoners' dilemma Nash equilibrium 74 to the Pareto Optimal Frontier, "the locus of achievable joint evaluations from which no joint gains are possible." 75 As Ian Ayers noted, "While the defining aspect of cooperative games is the ability to make binding commitments, the leading game-theoretic models of bargaining and contracting are non-cooperative. In these models, the binding, externally-enforced nature of the contractual commitments Ahdieh further explains: "Because of this interdependence, there are 'multiple equilibria' in coordination games: more than one set of choices from which neither party will deviate, absent a change in strategy by their counterpart as well. As a result, the solution to coordination games -and hence the determination and prediction of relevant social outcomes -does not lie in any single individual alone." Id. at 64. Instead, the players' "strategies are interdependent, such that each one's choice depends on the other's." Id.
73 As Berg and Kamminga stated in regard to contracting a strategic alliance, the contract "effectively supports the alliance form and prevents parties from reverting to their former uncooperative and adverse behavior when conflicts arise." Van den Berg & Kamminga, supra note 62, at 59. 74 As Ayers explains, "A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate from her strategy given that the other players do not deviate." Ayers, supra note 71, at 1297. Although all dominate strategy equilibria are also Nash equilibria, the converse is not true. Id. at 1297 n.36. 75 HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 139 (1982) . An outcome is deemed Pareto optimal if it is impossible to make any party better off without making at least one other party worse off. Id.
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Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partnerships 387 'black boxed' as binding payoffs for struck bargains." 76 In this Part and in Part V we look inside that "black box" in the context of PPPPs.
A. Avoiding the Inefficient Nash Equilibrium in the Prisoners' Dilemma
The prisoners' dilemma game, 77 which involves two individuals who have been arrested while in possession of stolen goods, demonstrates why two people will choose not to cooperate to their mutual advantage when they cannot ensure that the other party will not seek a better deal by defecting. The game assumes that a prosecutor has only enough evidence to convict the prisoners for possession of stolen goods unless one or both of them confess to burglary. The penalty for possession of stolen goods is substantially less than the sentence for burglary. The two prisoners are placed in isolation and therefore cannot talk to each other. The prosecutor visits each prisoner and offers each the same deal. If a prisoner confesses and testifies against the other prisoner, he will go free, while the other will receive the maximum sentence of four years. If both prisoners confess, they will each get two years in prison for burglary. If neither confesses, each prisoner will get half a year in prison for possession of stolen goods. As seen in Table 2 , "confession" is the dominant strategy 78 because it is the optimal choice for each player regardless of what the other player does. Thus, the game ends with both players spending two years in prison instead of only half a year, demonstrating that decisions that are rational from an individual's view are not rational when compared with the results attainable if both parties can communicate with each other and reach a binding agreement. 76 Ian Ayers, Three Approaches to Modeling Corporate Games: Some Observations, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 419, 422 (1991) . Ayers quotes Eric Rasmusen for the proposition that " '[c]ooperative game theory may be useful for ethical decisions, but its attractive features are inappropriate for most economic situations, and the spirit of the axiomatic approach is very different from the utility maximization of current economic theory.'" Id. at 423. But Ayers goes on to acknowledge, "As an empirical matter, it is possible that the equity axioms of the cooperative solution concepts correspond more directly to reality." Id. This prediction is borne out by research by behavioral economists who combine economics with psychology to evaluate how test subjects actually respond to various scenarios. See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 1 (2009) ("To understand how economics work and how we can manage them and prosper, we must pay attention to the thought patterns that animate people's ideas and feelings, their animal spirits."); Ahdieh, supra note 72, at 44 (" Experimental studies by both economists and psychologists have revealed systematic deviations from rationality across a wide array of settings."). 77 GAME THEORY 196 (1989) .
78 "[A] set of strategies constitutes a dominant strategy equilibrium if each player's strategy is a best response to any strategies of other players." Ayers, supra note 71, at 1297 n.36.
388
Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 4 The aim of the PPPP contract is to move the parties from the negative payoffs of (-2, -2) and to avoid the dangerous (0, -4) and (-4, 0) situations by making it possible for both partners to achieve positive utility. This requires both cooperation and coordination. Changing the payoffs and making the incentives to cooperate more valuable while also making deviations from cooperation more expensive will promote cooperation. 80 Looking at the future and envisioning repeat games enables parties to better coordinate and cooperate. In the context of PPPPs, repeat games facilitate knowledge transfer between the inventor team and the licensee, thereby reducing coordination costs. 81 Coordination costs result not only from misaligned incentives 82 but also from the "inability to synchronize joint efforts, either because of inadequate mutual knowledge or difficulty in creating such knowledge."
83
In a pure-coordination game, the players' interests are convergent; in contrast, in a pure-conflict game, the interests are divergent. 84 Both are games of strategy because "each player's best choice of action depends on the action he expects the other to take, which he knows depends, in turn, on the other's expectations of his own." 85 PPPPs are what Thomas Schelling calls mixed-motive or bargaining games because they involve both mutual dependence and conflict. 86 For example, academic researchers and private firms need each other to take an invention from the bench to the bedside, but the private firm may prefer to be the exclusive owner of all the intellectual property while the academics may prefer to put at least some of it in the public domain. 79 See RAPOPORT & CHAMMAH, supra note 77, at 24-25. 80 Ongoing relationships such as joint ventures and long-term PPPs can be seen as a precursor to more intimate cooperation as compared with short and finite activities. Long-term relationships can by themselves overcome the dilemma and achieve the optimal outcomes. 
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As discussed further in Part III (B), coordination requires trust, cooperation, and negotiation of an appropriate binding agreement with a focus on the agreed-upon common goals as well as on the efficient sharing of monitoring, control and property rights, coupled with positive incentive mechanisms. By creating a game-changing, legally binding contract and respecting relational norms, the parties can solve the inefficiency in the game and generate joint positive payoffs of the sort depicted in Table 3 . If both parties agree to a well-drafted binding contract and abide by relational norms, then they both have a positive utility of 5. These payoffs are arbitrary numbers whose importance is their relative value and sign. If the parties cannot agree on a contract but abide by relational norms then the joint utility (2, 2) would still be positive, that is, greater than it would be if there was no cooperation at all but lower than what would result from a binding contract supplemented by relational governance (5, 5). The same is true if there is a contract but relational norms are violated (3, 3). Given the critical importance of allocating intellectual property rights by contract, we are assuming that the joint utility is less in this situation, though that may not always be the case. If, however, a party breaches the contract, unless the other party waives its contract rights, this opportunistic behavior results in a loss to the non-breaching party (say, -2), which may be compensable at least in part by damages, and ill-gotten gain by the breaching party (say, 4). [Vol. 4
As discussed in Part V(C), a trusted intermediary can ensure that neither party seeks to gain advantage at the expense of the other. This relation is similar to that of a defense attorney, hired by two prisoners, who is bound in advance to pass along only plea bargains offered by the prosecutor that treat both prisoners the same.
87
B. Relational Governance as a Complement to, not a Substitute for, a Binding Contract
As explained in the literature on incomplete contracting, 88 it is impossible, without incurring virtually unlimited transaction and monitoring costs, to devise a long-form contract that covers every contingency. Some assert that an enforceable long-term contract is inherently antithetical to trust building and other relational norms, and instead encourages opportunistic behavior. 89 However, a study of outsourcing arrangements between U.S. and Indian firms found that "clearly articulated contractual terms, remedies, and processes of dispute resolution" can complement trust-building behavior, such as bilateralism, flexibility, and repeated exchanges. 90 Similarly, a study of German contracts for the purchase of software in Asia and Eastern Europe found that German companies use formal contracts "as [ ] communication document [s] ," which is especially important when there are "no common sociocultural norms that could implicitly govern the exchange beyond the contract itself." 91 As one German expert put it, "[O]ne still needs a contract as the basis of cooperation so that everyone knows what one talks about and what is expected." 92 Even if a German company elects not to sue for breach of contract because the verdict could not be enforced in court, German companies can use private enforcement mechanisms to ensure contractual performance. These private enforcement mechanisms include: (1) checking the reliability of potential business partners, (2) dividing transactions into milestone phases with an option to abandon if a milestone is not met, (3) monitoring and controlling the actions of their foreign contracting party by, for example, securing the right to access directly that party's internal project management systems, and (4) relying on "over-
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Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partnerships 391 arching reputational networks, which consist of companies, foreign trade chambers, and trade associations." 93 These techniques are also available to the participants in a PPPP.
As Thomas Dietz explained, by performing real-time monitoring and employing milestones, which are both forms of relational contracting, "the involved actors turn the transaction from a simple prisoners' dilemma into a repeated game . . . ." 94 In a repeated game, in which the parties use the Titfor-Tat strategy, 95 it is possible to encourage cooperation. 96 By using the above-mentioned clauses, the parties can realize benefits.
Legally astute managers partner with counsel to create shared value by remaining actively involved in the negotiation process. 97 This process allows the manager to get to know the counterparties better and clarify expectations and objectives, thereby strengthening relationships. 98 As Steve Huhn, Vice President of Strategic Outsourcing for HP Services, remarked: "Negotiating these kinds of deals requires being honest, open, and credible. Integrity is critical to our credibility." 99 In short, "[T]he goal is to create value by crafting a workable deal, not to position the company for a lawsuit." 100 Asymmetric information can lead to inefficient contracting, even in the absence of transaction costs. 101 Open books and the sharing of all transaction-relevant information pursuant to binding agreements can mitigate 102 the risk of hold-up and defection. 103 Thus, symmetric information is needed to align incentives and obtain joint optimization. 104 The greater the volume of information exchanged, the more likely joint utility will be optimized.
For example, the in-house staff at Pfizer works side-by-side with leading academics in basic and translational science in Pfizer's Centers for Therapeutic Innovation. 105 The researchers have access to Pfizer "compound 392
Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 4
libraries, proprietary screening methods, and antibody development technologies that are directly relevant to the investigators' work." 106 Academic principal investigators (PIs), postdocs, and Pfizer scientists work jointly on research projects in both the Centers for Therapeutic Innovation laboratory and academic laboratories. This arrangement facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge and enables the inventor team and the licensee to better synchronize their commercialization efforts. Furthermore, by establishing a compensation mechanism that rewards cooperation and joint optimization, a welldrafted PPPP contract creates the opportunity for changing the parties' behavior.
This approach is consistent with the Proactive Law approach, which began in Scandinavia and was officially embraced by the European Economic and Social Committee in 2009. 107 In the case of contracts:
A proactive contract is crafted for the parties, especially for the people in charge of its implementation in the field, not for a judge who is supposed to decide about the parties' failures. Instead of providing the most advantageous solution for one of the parties, in case of the failure of the other party to comply with its contractual obligations, the proactive contracting process and documents seek to align and express the interests of both sides of the contract in order to create value for both.
108
Studies point to the win-win aspect of PPPPs to develop low-cost drugs for developing countries, which often result from the public sector's need for medicine with the potential for only a small or even negative return on investment for the pharmaceutical company. For example, Solomon Nwaka 109 analyzed the development of malaria drugs in developing countries pursuant to Medicines for Malaria Venture's partnerships. In the Medicines for Malaria Venture, Win-Win Proposition-partnerships, 110 the parties must commit to
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Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partnerships 393 a long-term relationship and share the risks and rights under a common understanding with joint goals. 111 Nwaka found a positive correlation between the distribution of intellectual property rights and the extent to which targets are achieved. 112 Because the Medicines for Malaria Venture partnerships involve the public's demand for expensive medicine-not private industry's demand for marketable drugs-Nwaka's results cannot be attributed directly to the types of PPPPs analyzed in this article. Nonetheless, these results illustrate existing alternative contractual models within the pharmaceutical industry that are based on the idea of cooperation and accordingly offer insights for other types of PPPPs. 113 Additional insights can be gleaned from public-private partnerships in the infrastructure space, both in the U.S. and the EU.
IV. LESSONS FROM PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
The construction industry has used long-term partnering and public-private partnership (PPP) contracts as a strategic tool to maximize the utilization of public and private resources and to diversify risk. 114 A traditional arm's-length contract in the construction industry is based on each party maximizing its utility by defining the performance expectations in terms of quality and quantity, breach, warranties, liability, and dispute solutions. In contrast, partnering contract paradigms in the construction industry include clauses incorporating trust, cooperation, symmetrical information, positive incentives, and successive negotiation. 115 As a result, construction publicprivate partnerships are in many respects analogous to PPPPs. [Vol. 4 In the U.S., the concept of infrastructure partnering dates back to the 1960s, when the U.S. government developed a method of stimulating private investments in infrastructure. 116 The goal was "to protect [the] public interest while . . . bringing investment potential and added value from the private sector." 117 The use of public asset sales, outsourcing, and divestitures of state-owned enterprises became a vehicle for improved public service in a free market economy, 118 and Sir John Egan presented in this regard a report, Rethinking Construction, 119 in 1998. The Egan Report resulted in what is now the well-established partnering concept, 120 which includes collaboration, negotiation, and common utility. According to the Egan Report:
[e]ffective partnering does not rest on contracts. Contractors can add significantly to the cost of a project and often add no value for the client. If the relationship between a constructor and an employer is soundly based and the parties recognize their mutual interdependence, then formal contract documents should gradually become obsolete. 121 For the reasons provided in Part III(A), we respectfully disagree and view formal contracts and trust-building as complements, not substitutes.
The first model partnering contract was created in 2000. 122 It included clauses incorporating trust, cooperation, information, positive incentives, and successive negotiation. 123 The objectives of a partnering contract are to reduce cost and price, to increase quality, to reduce risk and failure, to improve coordination, and to share responsibility and capacity. Through a wellcrafted partnering contract, the parties can realize additional value compared with other approaches, as long as an effective implementation structure exists and the objectives of all parties can be met within the strategic alliance.
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The utilization of the partnering contract concept led to the creation of public-private partnerships for the construction of public buildings and infrastructure. 124 Governmental recognition of the efficiency of market mechanisms and the success of privatization efforts in several countries has led to increased governmental interest in PPPs. 125 Over time, governments have tapped private financial markets to fund higher-quality construction while reducing taxes. 126 Private companies were able to access new markets and developed new ways to compete and meet consumer demand.
A traditional PPP infrastructure project involves a longer legal relationship and addresses different public needs than a PPPP. Nevertheless, the two can be compared along the control and joint utility dimensions. Research on infrastructure PPPs has emphasized both that (1) the public party must give up some degree of control and allow the private party to realize an attractive yield on its investment and (2) the private party must possess sufficient expertise to reduce the total cost over time.
127
The same applies to PPPPs. The pharmaceutical enterprise must give up some degree of control and set up a mutual relationship with university researchers to achieve joint utility. Opposite to the public infrastructure sector, it is the private pharmaceutical enterprise that needs the public-funded research and the skills of the academic scientists, due to its above-mentioned lack of path-breaking, in-house innovation and investment in basic science, especially across disciplines.
128 Thus, the public university party will stand in a superior negotiating position if either (1) the private party's utility is higher than the university's utility or (2) the university party has the relevant knowledge, such as resources, funding, research, and the ability to confer legal rights, that the private party needs. Thus, the private pharmaceutical enterprise must identify the positive gains with respect to both the private and the public agenda and accept a contract favorable to the public party to obtain 124 In the late 1990s, national governments no longer regarded themselves as having a purely domestic role in an increasingly internationalized world. Instead, they were forced to act more like market players. 128 Private firms also need an appropriate intellectual property regime and contract enforcement mechanisms provided by government. In turn, the pharmaceutical firm bears the significant legal and financial risks associated with developing, approving, and marketing new products.
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V. CRAFTING AN EFFICIENT PPPP AGREEMENT
The prisoners' dilemma shows that the parties, acting alone, will selfoptimize. A well-crafted and fully enforceable PPPP contract can help prevent self-optimization and instead promote joint optimization and efficient allocation of added value.
A. "Add-On" Contract Clauses
Certain "add-on" contract clauses promote long-term, Pareto optimal collaborations between pharmaceutical companies and universities in the research discovery phase, the stage in the value chain at which a strategic alliance can create benefits for both the university and the pharmaceutical business. For example, positive incentive clauses ensure that both parties have an incentive to add value for each other. They create a bigger pie and a more efficient allocation of the slices through the articulation of common goals, shared value creation, and joint optimization.
Examples of clauses aimed at joint optimization include the following: 129 1. The parties shall together pursue a strategic alliance by joint initiatives and optimization for the benefit of the transaction. The parties recognize that the benefit of joint optimization requires specific legal clauses. 2. The parties agree to fulfill their obligations within the agreed binding clauses in respect to common goals and the value added by joint optimization. 3. The parties agree to work and conduct research together in the spirit of the project, openness, trust, and collaboration. 4. The contract shall stay on the table in the lab. The parties shall use the contract on a daily basis and educate the involved staff, researchers, and legal back office in a joint optimization spirit. The parties acknowledge that the contract is the tool to create added value. 
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Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partnerships 397 which they become aware and shall immediately propose solutions designed to jointly optimize the transaction. 6. It is a requirement that all relevant information be made available to all parties because it generates transparency, trust, and confidence. Accordingly, all parties shall open up the books and calculations concerning the transaction. 7. The parties must ensure each other a healthy business case and optimal research conditions and recognize that they have different economic yields from the project. 8. Due to the above clauses, the parties shall establish, develop, and implement a strategic alliance relationship in the lab with the objectives of achieving: -Mutual cooperation -Joint research -Common goals -An understanding of each other's values and the joint value of the transaction -Innovation -Improved efficiency -Delivery in accordance with Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and timetables. 9. Any research, added value, risk, pain and gain identified by the parties shall be subject to incentive payments. 10. The parties shall investigate all possible positive incentives to fulfill the value added transaction. The parties shall be awarded for and encouraged to maximize their effort for the benefit of the transaction and to allocate the added value in accordance with the key factors in paragraphs 8 and 9. 11. Any dispute shall be resolved as soon as possible and the parties shall apply the specific strategic alliance guideline: When a problem arises, the first responsible director shall gather the parties and, based on the following objectives, launch a procedure to solve the problem: -Common goals -Optimization of the transaction -Trust and cooperation -Openness, open books and calculations If the problem persists, the next director in the hierarchy shall be given responsibility for the problem, then a mediator and finally an arbitrator. At every stage, the above points shall be observed. All parties recognize that even when they experience conflict, common goals and optimization lead to added value for the transaction.
Pharmaceutical Public-Private Partnerships 399 and function of the university's TTO when drafting the PPPP agreement to avoid the inefficiency of a traditional licensing game.
As an example, Pfizer's Centers for Therapeutic Innovation PPPPs are governed by an agreement that provides that all shared inventions will be jointly owned, with Pfizer's holding an exclusive option to license a drug after proof of mechanism. 137 In the event Pfizer exercises its option, any jointly developed enabling intellectual property (IP) will be licensed from the academic institution. 138 If Pfizer declines, the IP and other joint assets revert to the institution. 139 When crafting contract clauses allocating the IP rights between the parties, one must recognize that the parties have different utility functions. The private pharmaceutical company is driven by a shareholder focus, while the university focuses primarily on research and patients. When parties have different utility functions, the party with the higher utility will invest more, even when a disproportionate share of the benefits accrues to the other party. 140 This can be seen in the game theory example of the "Odd Couple." 141 Two persons live in the same apartment but they value having a clean place to live differently. It takes twelve hours to clean the apartment per week. The players have three, six, or nine hours of cleaning as the possible strategies. As seen in Table 4 , if Person A derives the greatest utility from a clean apartment, then (1, 2) is the equilibrium and solution of the game. If the utility function of the parties in a PPPP is input into the above game, the pharmaceutical company acts similarly to Person A because its utility function from commercialization is larger than that of the university (Person B). This game shows how, in a contractual context, the various utility functions affect the allocation of the added value attainable by commercialization. Thus, the pharmaceutical company may, for contractual purposes, be ready to generate more utility for the university through the
